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Israel’s Mizrahim: 
“Other” Victims of Zionism or a Bridge 
to Regional Reconciliation?
Franklin Hugh Adler
It may come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with Israeli society, 
and especially those who have been led to believe it primarily com-
posed of European Jews who settled in the Middle East, that roughly 
half of Israel’s Jewish population is made up of Jews who for millennia 
were deeply rooted in the region and summarily expelled from Arab 
states after Israel was founded in 1948. In fact, this Arab Jewish popu-
lation exceeds in number those Palestinians who were displaced, and it 
possessed substantially greater property that was confiscated without 
compensation upon expulsion.1
The purpose of this essay is not to illuminate the so-called “silent 
exodus” that went largely unnoticed in the West and remains stub-
bornly unrecognized by Arab nationalists today insofar as they focus 
only on the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, neglecting the Jews, 
an organic part of Arab communities, who suffered a similar fate at 
their own hands. I seek neither to compare nor equivocate between 
competing victimizations, nor still less to suggest that mistreatment of 
one group in any way normatively justifies mistreatment of the other. 
By now, such arguments strike me as futile, although obviously the 
two cases cannot be historically severed, one from the other, as they 
unfolded in the same region and at the same time. My focus rather will 
be on the relationship of the Arab Jews, or Mizrahim, to Zionism and to 
the future of the Middle East.
I seek to explore a certain orientalist, anti-Arab blindness embedded 
in Zionism, a blindness which Mizrahi Jews may help rectify, while at 
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the same time opening up at least the imaginative possibility of recog-
nition2 and reconciliation between Arabs and Jews in the region and 
throughout the world. To date, Zionism seems to have come to a dead-
end. Despite a robust economy, world-class universities, and a demo-
cratic polity that, although imperfect, is incomparably better than any 
other in the region, Israel more and more has become a joyless security 
state, neither at peace with itself, the Palestinians, nor neighboring 
states in the region.
Arab nationalism, by all measures, has been an even greater failure, 
having produced, for the most part, stagnant economies and corrupt, 
autocratic polities, incapable of meeting the basic economic, social, and 
educational needs of their citizens. Embedded in Arab nationalism is 
a parallel anti-Zionist blindness that often manifests itself in a crude 
form of anti-Semitism readily apparent in public discourse and in the 
Arab media. The region, once a flourishing space of commerce, culture, 
and ethnic tolerance, clearly deserves better, but remains crippled by 
irreconcilable nationalisms and the closed, hostile borders they have 
produced.
Perhaps the Mizrahim, themselves both Arab and Jew, might help 
bridge the great divide. It should be clear that this essay departs nei-
ther from a narrow empirical assessment of the facts on the ground, 
nor is it burdened by a realist’s cautious assessment of proximate pos-
sibilities for peace. Rather, through an examination of the Mizrahim, I 
try to open up a discursive space from which one might imagine alter-
native possibilities for mutual recognition.
The terms Mizrahim, “Orientals,” or “Easterners” refer to Jews who 
came from the Arab world, as opposed to Ashkenazim, those who came 
to Israel from Europe. Not merely a demographic term, it came to be 
used only during the early 1990s by leftist non-Ashkenazi activists3 
in contradistinction to what Ella Shohat calls the “unmarked norm of 
‘Ashkenaziness’ or Euro-Israeli ‘Sabraness.’ ”4 It gradually replaced the 
older term Sephardim (literally, “those of Spanish origin”), not merely 
because most non-Ashkenazi issued from Jewish communities in 
the Arab world older than and relatively autonomous from Iberian 
Jewry, but, in the usage of Mizrahi activists, it took on an oppositional, 
resistant connotation about Ashkenazi hegemony. As Shohat puts it, 
“Mizrahim, I would argue, condenses a number of connotations: it 
celebrates the Jewish past in the Eastern world; it affirms the pan-Ori-
ental communities developed in Israel itself; and it invokes a future of 
revived cohabitation with the Arab Muslim East.”5 In contemporary 
Israel, Mizrahim has gained broad currency in the press and scholarly 
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literature, largely as a substitute for Sephardim, sometimes with, some-
times without, these additional ideological connotations.
*****
Most Mizrahim arrived after 1948, dispossessed and expelled from 
Arab states as a direct consequence of the founding of Israel. Few 
indeed came as committed Zionists, a political movement that had 
little salience among Jews in the Arab world. As one would phrase it in 
immigration theory today, the push factors clearly outweighed the pull 
factors. Compared to the Ashkenazi who had arrived earlier and estab-
lished a significant Jewish presence in Palestine, Mizrahim, generally 
speaking, were less modern, less educated, more observant, and had 
larger families. That they experienced discrimination and cultural mar-
ginalization is a fact that virtually no one in contemporary Israel any 
longer contests, though there is a lively debate among and between 
Mizrahi and Ashekenazi communities concerning the degree to which 
this can be read into a so-called “Zionist meta-narrative,” if not the 
very essence of the Israeli state.
Some would attribute the subordinate position of Mizrahis primar-
ily to the fact that they arrived after the Ashkenazi already were estab-
lished, or to their relative disadvantages in education and occupational 
skills, or their limited competence in Hebrew. Nevertheless, studies 
in stratification and social mobility by Sammy Smooha, Yinon Cohen, 
and others demonstrate that discriminatory patterns have persisted for 
more than forty years, and that the pattern of discrimination experi-
enced by the Mizrahim was later replicated in the case of “Europeans,” 
as opposed to “Asians” and Russians, as well as with the Ethiopians.
On the other hand, some argue that this discrimination from the 
outset was quite deliberate; it was deeply embedded in a European 
Zionist project and promoted as a matter of state policy which viewed 
the Mizrahim instrumentally; that is, the Mizrahim were seen as little 
more than an ample source of cheap labor to replace displaced Arabs 
and, at the same time, a means by which to rapidly double the number 
of Jews in Israel and help secure its borders against hostile Arab states.
Such an ungenerous view neglects the fact that predominantly Ash-
kenazi Israel transported and welcomed the Mizharim at a time when, 
as victims of Arab nationalist expulsion and dispossession, they had 
few other options. Not to be overlooked in this regard is the difficult 
objective situation in which the newly founded state of Israel found 
itself, having to confront, simultaneously, the manifold tasks of state-
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building while also absorbing a new population literally as large as the 
existing one. As badly as it might have been done, tremendous expen-
ditures nevertheless were devoted to meeting the pressing health, 
housing, educational, and occupational needs of the new arrivals, none 
of who indefinitely languished idle and hopeless in refugee camps. It 
is sometimes forgotten that a strict austerity regime was enacted. To 
obtain full employment and provide for an expanded range of social 
services, state expenditures were directed to sectors that did not sub-
stantially increase production or exports. Consequently, the national 
standard of living initially fell.6 Though an ideological commitment to 
equality was hardly realized, no honest analysis can deny the sacrifices 
and solidarity of the established Ashkenazi community with respect to 
the new Mizrahi arrivals (something rarely extended by Arab states to 
the Palestinians similarly dispossessed and expelled by Israel, most of 
whom were tolerated only as an unwelcome presence or became wards 
of the United Nations, languishing interminably in refugee camps).
Obviously, we are dealing with a complex and thorny question, espe-
cially as it relates to the present. First of all, Ashkenazim and Mizrahim 
are not hermetic categories that should be essentialized and reified. 
Both groups, different from one another, are themselves heterogeneous 
and amazingly diverse. Just as one might have asked, before the Holo-
caust, what an urbanized, sophisticated Jew of Paris or Berlin had in 
common with his rural counterpart in an eastern shtetl, the same holds 
for urban Jews of Baghdad and Cairo, as opposed to those from rural 
Yemen, Libya, or Morocco. Furthermore, there is a fluidity to Ashke-
nazi and Mizrahi categories that defies fixation, not only because there 
is an intermarriage rate that has varied from 22–28%, but also because 
what these categories actually signify today bears little resemblance 
to what they did earlier, especially during the 1930s or 1940s. Young 
Ashkenazi do not speak Yiddish, nor do most of them eat gefilte fish 
or other typically East European dishes. And young Mizrahi, as a rule, 
do not learn to read and write in Arabic or know very much about the 
contemporary Arab world, other than music, film, and food. This does 
not mean that identity traces have all but disappeared, and equally so 
for both groups. According to an expert on Ashkenazi identity, Orna 
Sasson-Levy, a sociologist at Tel Aviv University, Ashkenazi youth 
generally self-identify simply as Israeli or “Western,” and sometimes 
express envy of their Mizrahi counterparts who they feel still maintain 
a distinctive sense of community and ethnic particularity.7 For them, 
Ashkenazi is a relational category, not an affirmative one, much like 
whiteness in the United States, perceived by most American whites only 
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in relation to minorities, and especially to affirmative claims made by 
minorities. Of course, this is also a manifestation of cultural hegemony, 
as it is a marker of “normality,” if not the national norm, despite the 
fact that Ashkenazi identity has lost almost all of its intrinsic meaning. 
Then again, many Mizrahim also self-identify simply as Israeli and 
some, such as the Hebrew University political scientist Avraham Sela, 
and Sasson Somekh, one of Israel’s most distinguished experts of Arab 
literature, both born in Baghdad, summarily reject the very term Miz-
rahim as meaningless and unnecessarily contentious, a category that 
certainly has no significance for their children born in Israel. Sela and 
Somekh, native Arabic speakers, see themselves as Arab Jews or, more 
to the point, as Iraqi Jews, orphans of a world and a hybrid cultural 
space that no longer exists.8 For Somekh, who aspired to be an Arabic 
poet before he was forced into exile, an Arab Jew is one who is fluent 
in Arabic, immersed in Arab culture, and part of a community deeply 
rooted in an Arab land. In this sense, the so-called Mizrahim in today’s 
Israel are no longer, strictly speaking, Arab Jews, especially those born 
after the 1950s.
*****
Although leftist intellectuals like Ella Shohat and Yehouda Shenhav 
(both also of Iraqi origin)9 speak of a growing sense of separate iden-
tity among their fellow Mizrahim, and occasionally deploy such hyper-
bolic terms as “resistance” and “revolt,” in fact no durable Mizrahi 
mass movement ever developed, apart from sporadic demonstrations, 
such as the Wadi-Salib street riots in 1959, and Black Panther activities 
in the early 1970s. Significantly, these localized and short-lived move-
ments were programmatically integrationist, not separatist in orien-
tation. According to Sammy Smooha, another Iraqi Jew himself and 
perhaps Israel’s leading scholar of stratification, there has never arisen 
a Mizrahi protest movement of any scale, and “protest has remained 
non-violent and largely unorganized.”10 Politically, most Mizrahi line 
up behind parties of the right, first Likud, then Shas. As opposed to an 
earlier period when there was little or no Mizrahi presence in cultural 
and political life, a growing number of Mizrahi professors (though by 
no means proportionate to their percentage of the population) teach in 
Israeli universities, including some of national prominence, mirrored 
by a similarly growing number of Mizrahi political leaders.11 The Miz-
rahim, in short, now have a critical mass of intellectuals and politicians 
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with which to articulate, together with dissident Ashkenazi, a different 
concept of Zionism and a different vision of the future.
Empirically, the claims made by Shohat and Shenhav strike many 
Israelis as exaggerated and overstated, but their critique of Zionism 
and Israeli policy by no means is insignificant or without important 
consequences. The heart of their critique centers on a process of “other-
ing,” whereby Arabness was placed in binary opposition to Jewishness, 
an expansive opposition that was at once religious, cultural, political, 
and moral. “Arabs” were now constructed as the historical enemy of 
an undifferentiated and unified “Jewish nation,” and anything Ara-
bic became a priori negative and suspect, if not pathological (Shen-
hav12 refers to this as a process of thoroughgoing “de-Arabization”). 
Jewish history, in the Zionist meta-narrative, became one-sidedly the 
history of European Jews into which Mizrahi Jews were supposed 
to assimilate retrospectively, though they were deeply embedded in 
Arab culture and had been an enduring part of the Middle East, not 
Europe, since biblical times, their communities substantially antedat-
ing the birth and expansion of Islam and Christianity. Mizrahim had 
never known the Ashkenazi world of Sholem Aleichem and Fiddler 
on the Roof, nor, more importantly, the distinctive European experi-
ence of anti-Semitism, or, for that matter, the Holocaust itself, which 
was so central both to the impulse for founding a Jewish state in Pal-
estine as well as its legitimation. Mizrahi identity, in this view, was 
thus “hijacked” and “kidnapped,” in a process that, as Shohat puts it, 
undermined “the hyphenated, syncretic culture of actually existing 
Jews, rendering the non-Jewish side of the hyphen not pertinent. This 
unidimensional categorization, with all Jews being defined as closer to 
each other than to the cultures of which they had been a part, is tanta-
mount to dismembering a community’s identity.”13
Needless to add, this “othering” led to the total exclusion of resident 
Palestinians, while admitting as full-fledged Israelis only those Miz-
rahim who, as fellow Jews, had purged the primordial stain of their 
Arabness. It is important to note that this particular critique originated 
only during the 1990s, developed by second- or third-generation Miz-
rahis who experienced neither the violent expulsion of their parents 
and grandparents from Arab lands nor the cultural shock of arriv-
ing in Israel where Arabs, who initially seemed more familiar than 
Ashkenazi Jews, now were to be regarded as the mortal enemy. Two 
further observations should be made regarding the new Mizrahi cri-
tique. Theoretically, it draws explicitly from Edward Said’s innovative 
critique of orientalism,14 as well as from then emergent post-colonial 
Franklin Hugh Adler
165
scholars such as Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, in contrast with 
the more structuralist and/or positivist inclinations of older Mizrahi 
scholars, especially in the social sciences. Secondly, unlike the genera-
tion of Arab Jews who arrived during the formative 1948–1952 period, 
they were born and raised in Israel. Products of Israeli socialization, 
they were separated linguistically, culturally, and geographically from 
the Arab world while, at the same time, they were marginalized from 
an unproblematic Sabra identity by their residual Arabness, a compo-
nent of their identity never fully erased. The few biographical accounts 
one encounters in the midst of the Mazrahi post-colonial theorizing 
speak of painful emotional turmoil and internal conflicts. An outrage 
repressed during childhood exploded with maturity, especially in 
coming to grips with having been made to feel ashamed of their par-
ents and of their distinctive origins, a “profound and visceral schizo-
phrenia, mingling stubborn self-pride with an imposed self-rejection, 
typical products of colonial ambivalence.”15
*****
The question here is whether this anti-Arabism was essentially con-
junctural and contingent, on the one hand (that is, a defensive, post-
1948 reflex to confront a humiliated and hostile Arab world, hell-bent 
on destroying the so-called “Zionist entity”), or, on the other, whether 
this orientalist “othering” had deeper historical and cultural roots that 
anteceded the European Zionist settlement in Palestine and hostile 
interaction with the Arab world. My thesis is that it was a product of 
both, a concatenation of contradictions stemming from the orientalist 
terms under which European Jews first experienced emancipation and 
modernization, well before arriving in Palestine, as well as from the 
objective exigencies of national survival, however distasteful, in the 
face of the unrelenting Arab hostility, warfare, and terror that marked 
the founding and formation of Israel. Toward the conclusion of this 
essay, I will return to the rather nasty side of nationalism in the Middle 
East (Arabs against Israelis; Israelis against Arabs, and particularly 
the Palestinians). It has become increasingly clear to me how much 
blood and hatred towards the other stains both sides of the Israeli-Arab 
impasse, as well as the degree to which one-sided and auto-exculpa-
tory affirmations of victimhood must give way to mutual recognition.
In a brilliant essay, “The Great Chain of Orientalism,” Aziza Khaz-
zoom16 argues that the pattern of ethnic exclusion in Israel can be 
seen as the last phase of a series of orientalizations experienced first 
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by European Jews, regarded as “Asiatics” during the course of the 
European Enlightenment. As is commonly known, resistance to Jewish 
emancipation and full incorporation into modernizing European states 
was justified on the basis of their distinctive group backwardness: their 
unusual appearance (beards, side locks, dress), ugly guttural language 
(Yiddish), irrational religious fanaticism, and Asiatic roots. Jews were 
understood to be backward because of their origins in Asia. Voltaire 
was not alone in voicing sentiments such that “the [ancient] Jews were 
vagrant Arabs infested with leprosy,” and many believed that “Jews 
operated as a fifth column for the Muslim enemy.”17 According to 
Khazzoom, Jews internalized this stigma, seeing themselves through 
the orientalizer’s eyes, “modernizing” as they grappled with assimila-
tion. They did this so successfully that they soon tended to outperform 
others in prestigious professions, academia, culture, and commerce. 
“As they moved into the Western European world, German and French 
Jews began organizing their identities around the east/west dichotomy, 
evaluating themselves and others according to conformity with the 
western cultural model.”18
The more they became “new” and “modern” Jews, the greater their 
discomfort with an oriental past, a discomfort that “became partic-
ularly important when they were placed in direct contact with the 
other, unwesternized Jewish populations.” As Khazzoom suggests, 
“for German Jews, East European (particularly Polish) Jewish com-
munities became an orientalized ‘other’ against which the Germans 
measured their own advancing westernization.” A short time later, 
French Jews orientalized Jews in Arab lands, in the form of mission-
ary-style projects aimed at Westernizing the oriental Jewish popula-
tion. A celebrated example is the Alliance Israélite Universelle school 
system, which throughout the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
provided Jewish children with unrivaled education, French linguistic 
competence, and exposure to Western norms. Khazzoom argues that 
this European orientalism, internalized by European Jews, was carried 
over into Zionism, particularly in its modernist aspirations (again, the 
creation of a “new Jew”):
Once a group had internalized the oriental stigma, identity projects—
whether advocating retention, transformation, or rejection of Jewish tra-
dition—and relations with groups perceived as less western—whether 
vilifying them as culturally backward, romanticizing them as carriers of 
unspoiled culture, or both simultaneously—were organized around the 
diametric opposition of a new, modern, secular west and an old, tradi-
tional, religious east.19
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If, at one level, Zionism was a rejection of Europe, at another it could 
be understood as a transformational Jewish move directed toward 
Europe, “a final bid for acceptance as equals in the European family.”20 
Herzl spoke of a “rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civili-
zation as opposed to barbarism.” Similarly, Ben Gurion stated, “We do 
not want Israelis to become Arabs. We are duty bound to fight against 
the spirit of the Levant.” And Abba Eban argued, “The object should 
be to infuse the Sephardim with an Occidental spirit, rather than allow 
them to drag us into an unnatural Orientalism.”21 Accordingly, Israel 
could be as Western (i.e., non-oriental) as Europe—of course, minus 
the Christian anti-Semitism that gave impulse to modern Zionism in 
the first place.
Khazzoom offers a compelling, if one-sided, argument, foreground-
ing a distinctive European orientalism embedded from the outset in 
modern Zionism, indeed stressing it to the total exclusion of a more 
contingent anti-Arabism that issued more immediately from violent 
Arab opposition, in word and deed, to the founding of Israel. At its 
root, this Zionist orientalism lies at the core of the new Mizrahi critique 
and accounts, not surprisingly, for its principled and rather remark-
able anti-Zionism. While Israeli nationalism is one-sidedly excoriated, 
Arab nationalism is treated with an understanding rarely articulated 
among Israelis or, for that matter, Jews more generally. For them, Arab 
nationalism, unlike Zionism, was a response not immediately to Jews, 
but rather to European colonialism. In this sense, it enjoys the same 
privileged status as all Third World anti-imperialist struggles. Second, 
for them, whatever the excesses of Arab nationalism, it nevertheless is 
rooted in and emerges from the same Arab civilization that also was 
created by Jews (that is, their very ancestors) as well as other non-
Muslim minorities. It is with this imagined or ideal Arab world, not 
its contemporary form, that they identify and aspire to reconnect. For 
Shohat, Arab nationalism “failed to make a distinction between Jews 
and Zionists and did little to secure a place for Jews.” The incred-
ible cultural hybridity that once characterized the Levant22 was largely 
eviscerated by a narrow nationalism that recognized only the Muslim 
majority, transforming the Middle East into a space that become ever-
more monocultural and obsessively homogeneous. In its response to 
Zionism, the Arab world evicted one of its most important constituent 
elements, the Jews. As Shohat recognizes in a particularly lucid pas-
sage:
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The Arab-versus-Jew binarism has placed Arab Jews outside the Arab 
world and has called up some historical memories of Arab Muslim hos-
tility to Jews-as-Jews. The fears, anxiety, and even trauma provoked 
by chants of ‘idhbah al-yahud’ (‘slaughter the Jews’) are still a burning 
memory for my parents’ generation, who lived the anti-Zionist struggle 
not as Zionist occupiers in Palestine but as Iraqi Jews in Iraq and as 
Egyptian Jews in Egypt. And while those chants can be seen as directed 
at ‘the Zionists,’ one cannot overlook the way they marked the psyche of 
Jews in Egypt, Iraq and Syria.
At the same time, with the pressure of waves of Ashkenazi Zionist 
immigration and the swelling power of its institutions, the distinction 
between Jews and Zionists was becoming ever more tenuous, to the 
benefit of European Zionism. The situation led the Palestinian Arabs to 
see all Jews as at least potential accomplices of Zionism. Had the Arab 
nationalist movements maintained the distinction between “Jew” and 
“Zionist,” as even some Zionist historians have recognized, it might 
have won Arab Jewish support for the anti-Zionist cause. The idea of a 
homogenous “Jewish Nation,” even when articulated by Arabs from a 
presumably anti-Zionist perspective, ironically ends up reproducing the 
very Zionist discourses that it opposes, specifically the Zionist claim to 
speak on behalf of all Jews.23
Even current Arab anti-Zionist critiques informed by the work of 
the “new historians,” as well as the Mizrahi critics, rarely make the 
distinction between Jews and Zionists, or recognize, without equivo-
cation, that Arab nationalism led to the dispossession and expulsion 
of Arab Jews, just as Zionism led to the dispossession and expulsion 
of Palestinian Arabs.24 Outside of isolated Arab intellectuals and mar-
ginalized Arab groups, Mizrahi intellectuals at the moment have no 
significant interlocutors. The Arab world of their imagination remains 
a relic of the past or a project yet to be fulfilled, without a critical con-
sciousness or a critical mass on both sides of the impasse that is willing 
and capable of bringing it to fruition.
Both nationalisms have committed original sins of exclusion. Both 
have blood on their hands, as fierce nationalisms always do in the 
quest to create purified identities and monopolized spaces against 
demonized others. It remains beyond this essay to suggest what recon-
stitution of Arab nationalism would be necessary to recognize and 
accommodate Israel. Obviously, the past informs the present, and here 
it should be clear that the former greatness of Arab civilization (its 
commerce, culture, and science) was built not upon turning inward, 
but rather upon robust hybridity and boundary-crossing, both inter-
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nally as a regional unit, and externally in its relationship with the West, 
especially the Greco-Roman inheritance.
Regarding Israeli nationalism, Zionism simply has to confront and 
come to terms with its own blindness. Though an exclusionary element, 
perhaps built upon what Khazzoom has called “the great chain of ori-
entalism,” emerged as dominant, from the very beginning there were 
other Zionist elements that recognized Arabs as full-fledged neighbors 
and called for the creation of a common home, a multicultural society, 
and even a highly decentralized unitary state modeled on Switzerland. 
In a 1907 essay, “The Hidden Question,” Yitzhak Epstein condemned 
the emergent myth of Palestine as an empty, depopulated desert, and 
underscored the importance of collaboration with the Arab residents 
whose customs and rights had to be respected. From the ashes of Otto-
man dominance a new country could be developed for all.25 Similar 
positions were advanced by Martin Buber as well as Judah Magnes, 
the first President of Hebrew University, who in 1948 intervened with 
United Nations officials, cautioning that a partition leading to the cre-
ation of separate Jewish and Arab states would lead to a bloodbath. 
Not to be forgotten as well is Brit Shalom, founded in 1925, which 
argued that politically, as well as morally, the Jewish-Arab question 
was central to Zionism. Led by Magnes, they formed a small political 
party, the Ihud, in 1942, and presented their ideas for a bi-national state 
first to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 and then to 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. Marginal-
ized by the Jewish Agency and the “governing” Yishuv, Brit Shalom 
found no Arab counterparts, nor any receptivity on the part of Palestin-
ian leadership toward cooperation. By no means was Zionism simply a 
monolithic movement, or an unbroken line running from Hertzl to Ben 
Gurion to Sharon. Alternative ideas and programs could be recovered 
and adapted to contemporary circumstances. Recently, an attempt was 
made on the life of Zev Sternhell, the famous historian and left-wing 
critic, himself a survivor of the Holocaust. Based upon a leaflet left at 
the scene, those responsible presumably are the very same West Bank 
settler groups notoriously confiscating land and abusing Palestinians; 
those groups who have threatened any Israeli promoting a peaceful 
solution and returning Palestinian land. The fact that Sternhell could 
denounce such zealots as “anti-Zionists”26 itself signals an alternative 
Zionism, one which, after Israel’s sixtieth anniversary, could act with 
greater generosity and self-assurance than the Zionism which marked 
the state’s uncertain founding in 1948.
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There is a central paradox to orthodox Zionism: Jews returning to 
the Middle East, their land of origin, while seeming to reject virtually 
everything that marks the Middle East as a distinct region, including 
Arab Jews, who remain an enduring part of the cultural landscape. If 
Israel sees itself simply as a Jewish “Western enclave” in the region, an 
enduring peace and bountiful collaboration with Arab states is highly 
unlikely. Moreover, its legitimacy and recognition in the international 
community will gradually erode, even among Jews in the Diaspora. In 
his classic 1981 study of Zionism, Shlomo Aveniri warned that Israel 
must not become only a mirror-image of Western Diaspora life. He 
contends:
if it becomes, for example, just another Western consumer society, then 
it will lose its unique identification for world Jewry. If an American or 
French Jew discovers in Israel only those qualities which he already pos-
sesses (and cherishes) in his own society, then he will not be able to raise 
Israel to that normative pedestal with which he would identify. An Israel 
that is a Mediterranean Brooklyn or Los Angeles or Golders Green can 
not serve as a focus of identification and self-definition for Jewish people 
from Brooklyn or Los Angels or Golders Green.27
Alternatively, if bridges are to be built, the Mizrahim obviously 
have a strategic role to play, and the promotion of Mizrahi Studies, as 
Shenhav argues,28 would be a necessary starting point. However, the 
unrelenting anti-Zionist position he advocates has no future for the 
simple reason that anti-Zionism as such will never be embraced by a 
majority of Israeli Jews, including Mizrahim (not even Shenhav’s own 
Iraqi Jewish family accepts his anti-Zionist politics). Rather, a reconsti-
tuted Zionism, one that embraces Mizrahi as well as European roots, 
could begin to repair two related problems.
First, it could begin the process of reconciliation with the Palestinians 
through serious intercultural programs of the sort never before initi-
ated by the Israeli state, programs that in most cases would be beyond 
the competence and sensitivity of most Ashkenazi. The exclusion of 
Palestinians from full participation in Israeli life, particularly those 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, can find no justification either in Jewish 
ethics or in the eyes of the democratic community of nations (including 
many Jews in the Diaspora). Israeli identity must finally be redefined 
in a way that recognizes all of its citizens; rarely has the founding 
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identity of any nation been unalterably binding on future generations, 
immune to changes in demography, culture, or the increasingly glo-
balized environment. A moderated Zionism, or post-Zionism, could 
certainly make space for non-Jews without relinquishing all that Israel 
has accomplished, in the same way as Western multicultural societies, 
despite wrenching challenges and tensions, have come to recognize 
others among them who were not part of the formative moment or the 
so-called historical nation.
The second issue concerns regional relations with the Arab world 
that are not simply a function of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, as 
much as these issues are inexorably bound. Led by the Saudis, who 
advanced a plan for full normalization of relations with Israel based 
upon a just settlement of the Palestinian question, at least some Arab 
states have begun to imagine a Middle East in which Israel is no longer 
a transitory “Zionist entity,” but a legitimate and enduring member. In 
January 2008, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the 
United States and the United Kingdom, argued that a comprehensive 
Israeli-Arab peace would be rewarded by the Arabs with normaliza-
tion, at which point the Arabs “will start thinking of Israelis as Arab 
Jews rather than simply as Israelis.”29 Despite the obvious conceptual 
gap between authentic cultural recognition and diplomatic normal-
ization, as well as a lamentable history of anti-Semitism embedded 
in Wahhabi Islam and evident still today in Saudi textbooks, Prince 
Turki’s statement nevertheless is indicative of a path by which think-
ing of Israelis as “Arab Jews” might be an intermediate step toward 
ultimately thinking of Israelis simply as Israelis. Who would be bet-
ter positioned in Israel to encourage this transformation than its own 
Arab Jews, the Mizrahim, as enduring remnants of a pre-nationalist 
age in the Middle East, when Arab and Jew had yet to become binary 
opposites, when collaboration—sometimes good, sometimes not so 
good—had been a living reality? •
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